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Abstract 
 
Experimental studies of common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas are frequently terminated with 
collapse of the resource; however, there is considerable evidence in real-world settings that 
challenge this finding. To reconcile this difference, we propose a two-stage model that links 
appropriation of the CPR and provision of public goods in an attempt to explain the emergence of 
cooperation in the management of CPRs under environmental uncertainty. Benchmark 
predictions are derived from the model, and subsequently tested experimentally under different 
marginal cost-benefit structures concerning the voluntary contribution to the provision of the 
good. Our results suggest that the severity of the appropriation problem is significantly mitigated 
by the presence of an option for voluntarily contributing a fraction of the income surplus from the 
appropriation phase to the provision of the public good. 
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1. Introduction  
Social dilemmas are characterized as interactive decision-making situations in which 
individual rationality results in Pareto-deficient outcomes. Arguably, one of the most 
pressing societal problems resulting from such dilemmas is the depletion of natural 
resources, which are, in many cases, managed under common property regimes 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975). Under these circumstances, a well-defined group 
of agents share the use of a common and divisible natural resource, generating a 
dilemma that results in resource depletion (Larson and Bromley 1990; Ostrom et al. 
1994). The dilemma that each group member faces is between increasing their own 
payoff by appropriating as large a share of the common pool resource (CPR) as 
possible, and the need to cooperate with other group members in order to achieve 
Pareto-optimal outcomes and thereby prevent the depletion of the resource.  
This “commons” dilemma has been the topic of extensive theoretical, empirical, and 
experimental research (see Ostrom et al. 1994 for an overview). While much of this 
research has assumed that the size and productivity characteristics of the CPR are well 
known by all group members, the role played by the environmental uncertainties 
characterizing most real-world commons, potentially complicating the attainment of 
Pareto-optimal outcomes in field settings (Ostrom et al. 1994), is acknowledged 
(Suleiman and Rapoport 1988). Results from this research generally find resource 
requests conforming to theoretical predictions, including circumstances in which 
aggregate requests might lead to complete resource collapse (Rapoport and Suleiman 
1992). However, mismanagement of CPRs is by no means a universal conclusion. There 
is empirical evidence from many local communities that users of CPRs have succeeded 
over generations in devising their own rules to restrict or regulate individual requests in 
ways that avoid such undesirable collective outcomes (Ostrom et al. 1994). These 
observations have prompted a program of experimental research aimed to identify the 
mechanisms and variables that might explain the emergence of cooperative behavior in 
the commons, ranging from contextual factors such as non-binding communication 
(Ostrom et al. 1994), repeated interaction (Herr et al. 1997), sanctioning and reward 
systems (Ostrom et al. 1992), endogenous collective choice (Walker et al. 2000), and 
informational structures (Villena and Zecchetto 2011) to individual preferences with 
social value orientations, such as altruism or warm glow (Andreoni 1995).  
A common assumption underlying these studies is that the problems that agents face in 
managing CPRs are strictly concerned with appropriation. While this assumption is 
made to gain analytical tractability (Ostrom et al. 1994), it detracts attention from other 
forms of social and economic interdependencies present in natural settings. As 
emphasized by Gardner et al. (1990), appropriators of CPRs often engage in a number 
of activities other than harvesting that ties them together. For example, farmers who 
jointly use an irrigation system organize a number of provision activities such as in-kind 
maintenance of the system (e.g., repairing irrigation ditches) or construction of 
structures to trap or retain agricultural waste (Dinar and Jammalamadaka 2013). A 
number of other examples in which appropriation and provision activities are linked 
together can be found in field studies examining the local governance of rice farming 
and fishing communities (Berkes 1986; Werthmann et al. 2010), groundwater users 
(Blomquist 1992), and grazing in forest-dependent communities (Agrawal 1992).  
Perceiving these provision activities as supply-side provision problems (Gardner et al. 
1990), the behavioral incentives that appropriators have to contribute towards provision 
activities parallel those of provision of pure public goods. Depending on the specific 
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characteristics of the situation, the marginal benefit that group members derive from the 
public good may, or may not, exceed the marginal cost of their contribution. The former 
case corresponds to the notion of fully “privileged” groups (Olson 1965), in which full 
contribution to the public good is a dominant strategy for each group member, 
generating the presumption that the collective good will be provided at socially efficient 
levels. When the marginal value of the public good does not exceed the cost of 
contributing, but does not fall short of it, the group is termed “intermediate.” Olson 
(1965) notes that the public good in this case may (or may not) be provided by the 
group members. Cases in which groups are neither privileged nor intermediate are 
classified by Olson (1965) as “latent,” and a presumption exists that the collective good 
will not be provided, since no member of the group has an incentive to contribute to its 
provision. Irrespective of the particular situation, and of considerable importance to our 
study, the case studies mentioned above show that an additional complexity in 
governing CPRs is that the use of one service or resource can affect the level of 
provision of other services or resources and, in turn, the severity of the appropriation 
problem may be reduced by the subsequent presence of these provision activities.  
Although accounting for these appropriation and provision interdependencies adds a 
layer of complexity to the analysis of the well-understood difficulties that attend the 
commons, we posit that it is the very presence of such interdependencies that might 
explain, in part, the emergence of cooperative behavior in the management of CPRs. 
Two factors support this argument. First, in contrast to the assumption of game 
independence in standard game theory, recent experimental evidence suggests that 
“behavioral spillovers” do exist when appropriation-like games and public goods 
provision games are played in ensemble, with participation in the latter affecting 
behavior in the former (Savikhin and Sheremeta 2012). Second, the presence of 
provision decisions may confer on the CPR users a “unified purpose” which has been 
previously proposed by Solstad and Brekke (2011) as an explanation for cooperative 
behavior in the commons. Based on the neutrality theorem in the literature on private 
provision of public goods, Solstad and Brekke (2011) show that if all group members 
contribute to the public good, any deviations from cooperative resource appropriation 
levels will be neutral in the sense that individuals offset such deviations through their 
own contributions to the public good. In such settings, the emergence of cooperation in 
the management of the common property is not accounted for by factors such as social 
norms, altruistic preferences, warm-glow, or infinite/indefinite interactions, but rather 
by the shared interest in the provision of the public good using the income surplus from 
the appropriation of the shared resource.  
Following this line of reasoning, this paper seeks to develop a theory of cooperative 
behavior in the commons that addresses the link between appropriation and provision 
activities occurring sequentially in natural settings. In exploring this link, the model 
developed herein and the experiments designed to test it attempt to account for and 
predict when appropriators of CPRs, rationally acting upon their own self-interest, 
generate appropriation levels that comply with the cooperative solution. In order to 
increase the realism of the model, resource use decisions in the CPR are modeled under 
conditions of environmental uncertainty, a feature that provides a more challenging test 
for the emergence of cooperative behavior in the commons.  
In the remainder of the paper, we first propose in Section 2 a two-stage model linking 
appropriation and provision decisions, and then solve it for theoretical benchmarks. 
Subsequently, in Section 3 we present three experimental conditions (treatments) 
designed to investigate appropriation behavior when provision activities are 
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characterized by different marginal benefit-cost structures. Experimental results are 
presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.  
II. A two-stage CPR model under environmental uncertainty  
We model the overall appropriation decision process of a CPR under conditions of 
environmental uncertainty as a two-stage game, in which stage 1 has the structure of the 
resource dilemma under environmental uncertainty proposed by Suleiman and Rapoport 
(1988), and stage 2 has the structure of the standard linear public goods game as 
explored, for example, by Isaac and Walker (1988).  
In stage 1, a group of n agents decide simultaneously and anonymously how much to 
request (appropriate) from a CPR whose accurate size is unknown. Rather, it is 
commonly known that the resource size, denoted by X, is uniformly distributed on the 
[, ] closed interval. Each of the n individuals may request any amount between 0 and 
 from the shared resource. After all the n requests are made, the accurate size of the 
resource is publicly revealed, corresponding to the random realization x of X. If the sum 
of group requests is less than or equal to x, then each agent is awarded his/her request. 
On the other hand, if the sum of group requests exceeds the size x of the resource, it 
collapses and each individual’s payoff is zero. In the latter case, the game ends. In the 
former case, it proceeds to stage 2.  
In stage 2, the same group of n agents has the opportunity to simultaneously and 
voluntarily contribute to a public good using the earnings from stage 1. Once all group 
members have submitted their contributions, the aggregate contribution to the public 
good is announced and individual earnings are calculated. This stage is implemented as 
a public goods game with a linear payoff schedule. If an individual contributes c dollars 
to the public good, then each group member (including the contributor) receives mc 
dollars from that contribution. Thus, the returns from contributions to the public good 
are both non-excludable and non-rivaled. Moreover, the amount not contributed to the 
public good may be thought as money allocated to the consumption of private goods.  
Assuming linear utility functions, and letting rj denote the request made by individual j 
in stage 1 and cj his/her contribution in stage 2, the expected payoff to the individual 
from the two-stage game is given by:  
   {
       ∑                                                             ∑   
 
     
 
   
(       ∑   
 
   )      (∑   
 
     )        ∑   
 
     
                                                                                            ∑   
 
     
 (1) 
The Nash equilibrium solution of this game is derived by backward induction. Thus, the 
second-stage Nash equilibrium is computed for each possible outcome of the first-stage 
game. The payoff to player j in the second-stage is           ∑   
 
   . The 
individual optimality condition requires an evaluation of the marginal effects of 
contributing to the public good and keeping the amount of first-stage requests. These 
conditions can be compared by taking the derivative of the payoff function in the second 
stage with respect to the individual contributions cj. This derivative is -1+m. Thus, m is 
the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of a contribution to the public good, and the 
marginal return of keeping the amount of first-stage requests is 1. 
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As long as m<1, the dominant strategy for each individual is to contribute nothing to the 
provision of the public good. Contributions to the public good increase aggregate 
payoffs, compared with keeping the first-stage requests for private consumption if 
n×m>1 (notice that m≤1/n implies that group payoffs are not maximized when all 
individuals contribute to the public good). Thus, if 1/n<m<1, the game poses a social 
dilemma in contributions, since total payoffs are maximized by each individual 
contributing the full amount rj to the public good, while the Nash equilibrium entails 
that each individual keeps the whole amount for private consumption. If m>1, then the 
unique equilibrium entails that each individual contributes the full amount to the public 
good, which coincides with the maximization of group payoffs. Finally, if m=1, then 
there is a continuum of equilibria with each individual contributing any amount of stage 
1 requests to the public good.  
We may now derive the symmetric Nash equilibrium solution for the resource dilemma 
game. To do so, we first differentiate the quadratic component in Equation (1) with 
respect to rj and equate the result to zero. Letting cj=γjrj, where 0≤γj≤1 is the fraction of 
first-stage request contributed to the public good, and noting that     (∑   
 
     )  
   ∑   
 
          , the result is:  
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It can easily be seen that the second derivative is negative, as required for a maximum. 
Assuming symmetry, so that   
    
 , the first-stage equilibrium request is given by: 
  
  
          
                             ∑      
                                
To characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game, we need to 
combine the second-stage solutions with equation (3). This requires an analysis of three 
possible cases: (a) the case where 1/n<m<1; (b) the case where m>1; and, (c) the case 
where m=1. These three cases correspond to the tracheotomy of latent, fully privileged, 
and intermediate groups introduced by Olson (1965). We turn next to these analyses.  
A. The case of “latent” groups: 1/n<m<1 
For m<1 in stage 2, no one contributes to the public good in equilibrium, i.e.,       
 . Thus,   
  
 
     
. However, it is important to note that this solution does not 
constitute the equilibrium request in all first-stage cases. If ∑   
 
     , then any vector 
of requests r*=(r1, r2, …, rn) whose elements satisfy the condition that ∑   
  
      is an 
equilibrium solution for the first-stage game. Assuming symmetry, the solution is 
  
  
 
 
. Therefore, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage game is: 
 
  
     (
 
 
 
 
     
)                   
         (4) 
As noted above, when 1/n<m<1, the Pareto optimal solution of the second-stage game 
entails full contribution to the public good by each group member. The Pareto optimal 
request of stage 1 can be solved as before, but assuming that only one agent is in charge 
of the resource. Assuming, as before, symmetry and risk neutrality on the part of group 
members, it can easily be checked that the Pareto optimal solution (which is 
independent of m and   in the first-stage) for the two-stage game is: 
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Comparison of Equations (4) and (5) shows that the equilibrium contribution is Pareto 
deficient, and that the equilibrium request is also Pareto deficient if         . 
Importantly, notice that the equilibrium request in the case of latent groups coincides 
with the equilibrium request that would be predicted if the game consisted of stage 1 
only. 
B. The case of fully “privileged” groups: m>1 
For m>1 in stage 2, every group member contributes to the public good in equilibrium, 
i.e.,        . This result can be used in Equation (3) to derive the Nash equilibrium 
request for the quadratic component in Equation (1). Doing so yields   
  
 
  
. As 
before, the solution   
  
 
 
 is also an equilibrium solution satisfying the condition that 
∑   
  
     . 
Therefore, the subgame-perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game in this case is: 
  
     (
 
 
 
 
  
)                   
    
       (6) 
It can easily be seen in this case that both the equilibrium contribution and the 
equilibrium request are Pareto efficient. 
C. The case of “intermediate” groups: m=1 
For m=1 in stage 2, individual group members are indifferent between contributing any 
amount to the public good or not contributing. Substituting the value of m into Equation 
(3) allows us to derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage game as: 
  
     (
 
 
 
 
      ∑      
)                   
        
  .   (7) 
Notice that assuming an interior solution where all other group members contribute to 
the public good, the Nash equilibrium request by individual j coincides with the Pareto 
optimal request, irrespective of her own contribution. In this case, the solution to the 
resource dilemma is socially efficient, even if contributions to the public good turn out 
to be socially inefficient due to free riding by player j. On the other hand, assuming an 
interior solution where none of the other group members contribute to the public good, 
the Nash equilibrium request by individual j is Pareto deficient if         , 
irrespective of her own contribution to the public good. 
 
III. Experimental design and theoretical predictions  
A. Procedures, parameters and treatments  
We designed a simple experiment operationalizing the two-stage game under 
environmental uncertainty described by equation (1), with groups composed of five 
(n=5) subjects and a commonly known resource size that is uniformly distributed on the 
[250, 750] closed interval, for an uncertainty range of 500 and an expected value of 500. 
Each subject participated in 40 repetitions (rounds) of the same two-stage game. Prior to 
the first game, each subject was randomly and anonymously assigned to a fixed group 
for the duration of the session. We implemented three MPCR conditions in a between-
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subject design. In the first condition, the parameter m was set equal to 0.5 (hereinafter, 
“Treatment I”); in the second and third conditions it was set equal to 1.0 (“Treatment 
II”) and 1.5 (“Treatment III”), respectively. These three values were chosen to capture 
the incentives faced by latent, intermediate, and fully privileged groups in stage 2 of the 
game.  
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects were provided with written 
instructions informing them that they could, individually and simultaneously, request 
from 0 up to 750 tokens from a shared resource, and that the precise value of the 
resource (called “random draw”) in any round was to be randomly extracted (and 
publicly announced) after all group members made their requests. Subjects were also 
informed that if the sum of group requests exceeded the randomly determined resource 
size in the round, then their individual payoffs in that round would be zero, and the 
game would terminate; otherwise, their individual payoffs in the round would equal 
their individual requests, and the game would continue to a subsequent stage in which 
they could contribute any fraction of their individual payoffs to a joint group project 
after observing the individual requests by all group members. Subjects were also 
informed that, in the latter case, their final payoffs for the round would equal the 
amount not contributed to the group project, plus the sum of group contributions 
multiplied by the value of m (based on the implemented treatment).  
In addition to a $5 participation fee, at the end of the session subjects were paid for the 
tokens accumulated in six (randomly determined for each subject) out of the 40 rounds, 
in which each token was worth 2 US cents. This procedure was implemented to prevent 
wealth effects. Each experimental treatment was implemented using the z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007) software, and each session lasted for about one hour. No 
communication between the subjects was allowed in any of the treatments. All the 
experimental sessions were conducted at the Behavioral Research Lab at the University 
of California, Riverside (UCR), which is a standard computerized laboratory with 
subjects’ stations placed in separate cubicles to ensure privacy. Subjects were recruited 
from the pool of UCR students registered to participate in research studies through the 
web-based subject recruitment. A total of 90 subjects participated in this experiment, 30 
(six different groups) of them in each of the three treatments.  
B. Theoretical predictions  
Table 1 presents theoretical predictions that are used as social welfare maximizing and 
equilibrium benchmarks for the analysis of the data from the three treatments. The 
Pareto-optimal request and contribution level, shown in the left panel of Table 1, are the 
same across the three treatments. In each case, the behavior that maximizes the 
aggregate payoff to all players entails full contribution of their income from the use of 
the shared resource to the public good, and a symmetric individual request (r) of 75 
tokens at stage 1 of the game, for a total group request (R) of 375 tokens. The 
probability of receiving this request (p) is 0.75, yielding an expected payoff of =56.25 
tokens in the first stage of the game. This corresponds to the maximum symmetric 
expected income from the use of the shared resource that subjects may achieve in this 
game, which they may then use to provide the public good.  
The symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium requests and contribution levels are 
presented in the right panel of Table 1. They coincide with the Pareto-optimal solutions 
in the case of the fully privileged groups of Treatment III, who have a dominant strategy 
of full contribution of their earnings from the use of the resource to the public good 
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(γ=1). Conversely, individuals in the latent groups of Treatment I have a dominant 
strategy of zero contribution to the public good (γ=0), implying a Pareto-deficient 
symmetric individual request of 125 tokens in equilibrium, for a total group request of 
625 tokens. The corresponding probability of receiving this request (p) is 0.25, yielding 
an expected payoff of =31.25 tokens in stage 1 of the game. Comparing the expected 
payoffs from following the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy to the Pareto-optimal 
solution yields an efficiency index (E) of 56%. This means that subjects are expected to 
achieve 56% of the maximum expected payoffs that may be achieved from the use of 
the resource if they follow the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy in this treatment.  
Whereas the contribution stage in Treatments I and III has a unique dominant strategy 
of zero and full contribution, respectively, it has a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash 
equilibria in Treatment II. This feature of the game also gives rise to a continuum of 
Pareto-ranked equilibria at the request stage, one of which is perfectly efficient. The 
Pareto-optimal equilibrium of the two-stage game in Treatment II is marked in italics in 
Table 1, where γ=1. The least efficient equilibrium (hereinafter referred to as 
“Suboptimal NE”) of Treatment II is also marked in italics, where γ=0. Whether 
individuals in these intermediate groups adopt Pareto-optimal or suboptimal strategies is 
theoretically undetermined. This stands in stark contrast with the unique equilibrium 
predictions in Treatments I and III.  
While the multiplicity of equilibria increases strategic uncertainty and, as a 
consequence, the probability of coordination failure (Van Huyck et al. 1990), it also 
underscores an important theoretical feature of Treatment II. Because there is no 
dominant contribution strategy, individuals in Treatment II may strategically use their 
requests from the shared resource as a means to influence the behavior of other players 
at the contribution stage. Thus, a significant restraint in individual requests by the group 
members, which can be considered cooperative behavior in managing the commons, 
may be the result of such individually rational strategic attempts to elicit provision of 
the public good at stage 2 of the game. Although the same type of strategic play may 
behaviorally be appealing to the subjects in Treatments I and III, they do not make part 
of a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy in these treatments, since no contribution and 
full contribution to the public good are, respectively, players’ best responses in 
Treatments I and III, irrespective of requests at the first-stage of the game.  
Finally, the equilibrium predictions in Table 1 are predicated on the assumption that 
individuals are sophisticated in the sense that they exercise foresight and consider the 
second-stage incentives when devising an equilibrium strategy for stage 1 of the game. 
In practice, however, such a strategic reasoning process may be problematic, and agents 
may instead adopt myopic strategies, viewing the request decision as only one stage in a 
sequence of games. In that case, the symmetric individual request in each of the 
treatments would equal 125 tokens, for a total group request of 625 tokens. Notice that, 
as pointed out in the previous section, such myopic requests coincide with the unique 
subgame-perfect requests of Treatment I and with the least efficient subgame-perfect 
requests of Treatment II. Observation of such request outcomes in these two treatments 
may be a consequence of myopic or strategic decision behavior. However, this is not so 
in Treatment III, in which the values of myopic requests do not make part of subgame-
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perfect predictions, thereby allowing for a clear distinction between the play of myopic 
or strategic strategies. 
1
  
IV. Experimental results  
The analysis of behavior within our experimental design is organized by examining in 
order: (A) resource-use behavior in stage 1 of the game in each treatment, (B) 
contribution decisions to the public good in stage 2 of the game, and (C) the relationship 
between resource-use and contribution decisions in each treatment. In each case, the 
main findings are presented in the form of summary results. 
2
  
A. First-stage results  
If subjects behave myopically, believing that the presence of provision activities has no 
impact on resource-use decisions, we should observe no differences in requests across 
treatments. In contrast to this prediction, we can report the following result.  
Result 1. Outcomes of myopic play are poor predictors of behavior, with resource-use 
behavior by all types of groups revealing a high degree of foresight in the two-stage 
setting.  
Support for Result 1 is presented in Table 2. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report, 
respectively, the mean individual requests over all 40 rounds in each treatment, and the 
first-stage efficiency index implied by such requests.
3
 The frequency at which requests 
were awarded, continuing the game to the second stage is presented in column 4 (the 
observed frequency of resource destruction in each treatment being the complement to 
this figure). The table reveals that, pooling across all rounds, mean individual requests 
are about 101, 81, and 90 tokens in Treatments I, II, and III, respectively. These 
requests are, therefore, lowest in Treatment II and highest in Treatment I. A pairwise 
application of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distribution functions 
shows that these differences in requests are significant at all conventional significance 
levels (p<0.0001). Clearly, mean requests in all treatments are substantially lower than 
the 125 predicted value had subjects ignored the second-stage incentives when making 
their request decisions. These results stand in stark contrast with the findings from 
previous experimental implementations of the CPR game as a single-stage game. For 
example, using the same parameters, Rapoport and Suleiman (1992) reported a mean 
individual request of 132.3 tokens in the single-stage game with groups of five players 
simultaneously requesting from a CPR whose size was uniformly distributed on the 
[250-750] interval. Other experimental results supporting the suboptimal equilibrium 
predictions of the single-stage CPR game under conditions of environmental uncertainty 
were reported by Rapoport et al. (1992). Thus, evidence from the three treatments 
rejects the hypothesis of myopic behavior in the two-stage decision making process. 
 
                                                          
1
 See Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) for a discussion of the consequences of myopic and strategic 
decisions in revenue management. 
2
 Although the analysis in the text focuses on individual behavior, all the results presented are supported 
by an extensive analysis (available from the authors) of behavior conducted at the group level. 
3
 The ratio of observed payoffs to maximal predicted payoffs at optimal benchmarks is often used in 
experiments as a measure of performance/efficiency to compare the effects of various treatments. 
Because the first-stage payoffs in our treatments depend not only on subjects’ requests but also on the 
random draw in the experimental sessions, a better measure of efficiency ensuring comparability across 
the treatments takes the expected payoff in the first stage of the game, rather than the actual payoff, as the 
numerator in the efficiency ratio. Thus, the efficiency index is measured by the ratio of expected payoff at 
the given request to the expected payoff at the Pareto-optimal request. 
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These observations are corroborated by examining the evolution of request behavior 
over time. Remember that a general finding in repeated CPR games is that behavior is 
consistent with efficient outcomes in the first few rounds of play, and approaches the 
equilibrium prediction of resource-overuse in the last rounds. Our next result provides 
information as to whether the presence of provision activities prevents the convergence 
to the single-shot equilibrium request level by the subjects in the latent groups of 
Treatment I.  
Result 2. Mean requests by subjects in latent groups are in between the Nash 
equilibrium prediction and the Pareto-optimal solution, converging to an equal-sharing 
of the expected value of the resource. Efficiency is high and resource destruction is low, 
compared with equilibrium predictions.  
Support for Result 2 comes from Figure 1, the summary statistics in Table 2, and from 
formal statistical analyses accounting for the presence of time and repeated interaction 
effects reported in the top panel of Table 3. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the mean 
requests over time in each treatment. It is clear from the figure that mean requests in 
Treatment I tend to lie everywhere below the equilibrium prediction of 125 tokens, with 
no steady pattern of convergence towards this prediction. These impressions are 
confirmed by the estimation of the Ashenfelter-El Gama model described in Noussair et 
al. (1995). For each treatment, this model is specified as:  
                                                          
                          
where     is the request made by subject i at time t,    is a dummy variable taking the 
unit value for all subjects in group i and 0 otherwise, t represents time as measured by 
the number of rounds in the experiment, u is the error term, and the ’s are parameters 
to be estimated. In this specification, the weight of    is zero when t=1, and only the 
values of     determine the dependent variable. As t gets large, however, the weight of 
   gets large because         approaches unity, while the weight of     gets small 
because     approaches zero. Thus, the parameters     measure the origin of a possible 
convergence process for each group, and the parameter    measures the asymptote of 
the convergence process of the dependent variable. Therefore, the latter is the main 
focus of the model since it represents the long-term tendency of the magnitude of the 
dependent variable. Because we are modeling a dynamic process, we allow for 
heteroskedasticity across subjects within the treatments, and also allow for the presence 
of first-order individual-specific autocorrelation in our estimation procedure. 
The estimated results of this model reported in Table 3 show that individual requests in 
Treatment I (  ) converge to a value of about 96 tokens, with individual requests in half 
of the groups converging toward this common asymptote from above, and half of them 
converging from below, reflecting the heterogeneous adjustment and repeated 
interaction effects across the groups.
4
 Although the asymptotic point estimate of 
requests is a bit lower than the overall mean, a long-term tendency to an equal sharing 
of the expected value of the resource (i.e., a request of 100 tokens) is not rejected as 
indicated by the 95% confidence limits of this estimate. As shown in the third column of 
Table 2, these requests imply a mean efficiency index of 80%, significantly higher than 
                                                          
4
 In addition to the estimates of the model given in the text, an alternative specification was estimated 
allowing the time series to converge to a different value for each group within each treatment. These 
estimates are not given here because they do not alter the main conclusions in the text. 
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the 56% predicted efficiency at the equilibrium request. Accordingly, although the 44% 
frequency of resource destruction in Treatment I exceeds the 25% Pareto-optimal 
prediction by 19 percentage points ((100-56)-25), it is also substantially lower than the 
75% equilibrium prediction, falling 31 percentage points below it.  
Turning to the analysis of the evolution of request behavior over time in Treatment II, 
we can report the following result.  
Result 3. Mean requests by subjects in intermediate groups approximate the Pareto-
optimal prediction. As a result, efficiency is considerably high, and resource damage is 
avoided at socially efficient levels.  
The dynamics of the subjects’ requests in Treatment II depicted in Figure 1 reveal the 
generally documented tendency for mean requests to increase over time. On average, 
requests are below the Pareto-optimal prediction of 75 tokens for the majority of the 
first 20 rounds, increasing steadily towards the second part of the experiment. The 
results of the estimation of the Ashenfelter-El Gama model in Table 3 show that 
individual requests in Treatment II (   )  converge to 81 tokens, with only one group 
exhibiting a pattern of convergence from below at very low request levels. This estimate 
does not differ from the overall mean request by the subjects in Treatment II, which 
exceeds the Pareto-optimal prediction by just six tokens (8%). These requests imply an 
efficiency index of 93%, a figure that is considerably high and clearly far apart from the 
56% predicted efficiency at the suboptimal equilibrium request. Arguably, more than 
harvesting levels or efficiency considerations, the most important measure of welfare 
from a societal point of view is the probability of resource collapse associated with the 
management of CPRs. As shown in Table 2, the observed frequency of resource 
destruction by the groups in Treatment II is 28%. This figure compares favorably with 
that implied by Pareto-optimal requests, and the difference is not statistically different 
from zero at conventional significance levels (z=1.192, p=0.233). Thus, although their 
requests are slightly above the point prediction for the socially efficient outcome, 
subjects in Treatment II are successful in avoiding the resource damage at socially 
efficient levels.  
Next, we turn to the evolution of request behavior over time in Treatment III, reporting 
the following result.  
Result 4. Mean requests by subjects in fully privileged groups exceed the Pareto-
optimal prediction. As a result, efficiency is lower, and resource destruction higher, 
than the equilibrium predictions.  
The support for Result 4 can be seen in Figure 1, Table 2, and the estimates in Table 3. 
Figure 1 reveals that mean requests in Treatment III are in between mean requests in 
Treatments I and II in the first 20 rounds of play, tending to approximate the latter in the 
last 20 rounds. The long-term tendency of requests by the subjects in fully privileged 
groups (    ) is estimated at 87 tokens, as shown by the results in Table 3. This estimate 
is lower than the overall mean request of 90 tokens, but it is not statistically different 
from it as indicated by the width of its 95% confidence interval. Moreover, comparison 
of the 95% confidence limits of the asymptotic request value across the treatments 
reveals that they do not overlap, indicating that the differences in requests’ convergence 
across treatments are statistically significant at better than the 5% significance level, 
with those in Treatment III significantly higher (lower) than those observed in 
Treatment II (I). Accordingly, the implied efficiency index in Treatment III is in 
between that in the other two treatments, at a value of 87%. As shown in Table 2, the 
 
 
13 
 
frequency of resource destruction is 35% in Treatment III, significantly exceeding the 
Pareto-optimal prediction by 10 percentage points.  
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B. Second-stage results  
As noted previously, subjects in the different treatments differed in their ability to avoid 
destruction of the common resource in stage 1 of the game. Consequently, the number 
of rounds in which contribution decisions are made (called “contribution rounds”) by 
the subjects is not the same across treatments. The maximum number of observed 
contribution rounds is 29, 34, and 33 by the subjects in Treatments I, II and III, 
respectively.  
Figure 2 depicts the mean contributions to the public good as a fraction of subjects’ 
endowments (i.e., income from the use of the shared resource) over contribution rounds 
in each treatment. Several useful observations can be drawn from the figure. First, no 
strong tendency for contribution fractions to drop over time to very low levels is 
observed in either treatment. This finding is consistent with results of Saijo and 
Nakamura (1995), who also reported fairly stable contribution rates in experimental 
treatments varying the MPCR (m=0.7 vs. m=1.4) to the public good. Secondly, and 
conforming to a priori expectations, contribution fractions are clearly lower in 
Treatment I than Treatments II and III. Specifically, concerning contribution behavior in 
the observed contribution rounds by members of the latent groups of Treatment I, we 
report the following result.  
Result 5. Mean contribution rates by subjects in latent groups coincide with the 40%-
60% contribution rate previously found in linear public goods games in which the 
unique equilibrium solution entails each player making a zero contribution.  
In addition to the results exhibited in Figure 2, support for Result 5 comes from the 
summary statistics presented in the right-hand column of Table 2, along with the results 
of the formal statistical analysis reported in the bottom panel of Table 3, with estimates 
obtained through a similar estimation procedure to the one previously reported, but 
considering contribution fractions in each treatment as the dependent variable in the 
Ashenfelter-El Gama model. The long-term tendency of contribution fractions by the 
subjects in latent groups (  )  is estimated at 44%, as shown by the results in Table 3. 
This estimate is lower than the overall mean contribution rate of 47% (Table 2), but it is 
not statistically different from it as indicated by the width of its 95% confidence 
interval.  
Concerning behavior in the observed contribution rounds by the subjects in the 
intermediate and fully privileged groups of Treatments II and III, we report the 
following result.  
Result 6. Mean contribution rates by subjects in intermediate and fully privileged 
groups coincide with the 60%-90% contribution rate previously found in linear public 
goods games, in which the unique equilibrium solution entails each player making a full 
contribution.  
As shown in Table 2, mean contribution rates amount to 76% and 72% of subjects’ 
endowments in Treatments II and III, respectively. These rates are significantly higher 
than the contribution rates observed in Treatment I, as indicated by the 95% confidence 
limits of the asymptotic contribution rates in each treatment shown in Table 3. The 
width of these confidence intervals also reveals that the difference in asymptotic 
contribution rates between Treatments II and III is statistically insignificant, and that 
they are not statistically different from their respective overall mean contribution rates. 
Notice that in each case contribution rates fall short of fully efficient contribution 
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outcomes, lying in the range previously reported in linear public goods games 
prescribing full contribution as dominant strategies (Brandts and Schram 2008).  
 
C. Relationship between requests and contributions  
An important result from the previous analyses is that although subjects in Treatments II 
and III contribute similar proportions of their endowments to the public good, requests 
by the former are significantly lower than requests by the latter. This result suggests that 
more cooperative behavior in the commons is needed from subjects in intermediate 
groups in order to generate the same levels of public good provision as that achieved by 
subjects in fully privileged groups. A counterfactual statistical analysis predicting the 
contribution fractions by subjects in Treatment II if they had made the same level of 
requests by the subjects in Treatment III provides support for this view.  
Result 7. Subjects in intermediate groups strategically use their requests from the 
shared resource as a means to influence behavior at the contribution stage.  
Table 4 and Figure 3 provide support for Result 7. Table 4 contains the estimated effect 
of requests on contribution fractions (γ), conditional on survival of the resource, in each 
treatment. Given the differential nature of the material incentives embodied in the 
second-stage of the game, we would expect a positive (negative) relation between 
request and contribution behavior in Treatment III (I) as self-interested income 
maximizers request more in stage 1 of the game in both treatments, but contribute more 
(less) of their endowment in Treatment III (I). As noted previously, although self-
interested income maximizers in Treatment II are indifferent between contributing or 
not contributing any amount of their endowment to the public good, strategic 
considerations may result in a negative relation between request and contribution 
behavior, as subjects attempt to elicit provision of the public good through more 
cooperative behavior in stage 1 of the game. Albeit of relatively small magnitude, the 
results in Table 4 conform to these expectations, with increased requests impacting 
negatively the contribution fractions in Treatments I and II, and positively the 
contribution fractions in Treatment III.  
Having found a differential impact of requests on contribution behavior in Treatments II 
and III, we now evaluate the contribution fractions that would have been observed in 
Treatment II in the counterfactual scenario where requests were at the levels observed in 
Treatment III. This is accomplished using the coefficient vector from the model relating 
requests and contributions in Treatment II and the observed behavior in Treatment III to 
predict what fraction of their endowments subjects in Treatment II would have 
contributed to the public good if they had faced the level of requests observed in 
treatment III.
5
 The cumulative frequency distribution of this counter-factual predicted 
contribution fraction is exhibited by the dashed line in Figure 3. Also exhibited in the 
figure (solid line) is the predicted contribution resulting from the estimated model using 
the actual requests in Treatment II. Figure 3 clearly reveals that contribution fractions 
by subjects in Treatment II would have been substantially lower had they faced the 
same level of requests observed in Treatment III. On average, subjects are predicted to 
contribute 76% of their endowment using the coefficient vector of the estimated model 
                                                          
5
 For completeness, counter-factual predictions for contribution fractions in Treatment III were generated 
using observed request behavior in Treatment II. The resulting mean predicted counter-factual fraction is 
71% of subjects’ endowments, indicating that the lower level of requests observed in Treatment II would 
not generate different contribution decisions from those observed in Treatment III, given the actual 
request behavior in this treatment. 
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for Treatment II and the actual data for this treatment, a figure that matches its overall 
mean contribution fraction. The counterfactual predicted contribution fraction is, on 
average, 69%, and the application of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of 
distribution functions shows that differences between the actual and counterfactual 
predicted contribution fractions are significant at all conventional significance levels 
(p<0.0001). In addition to the differential impact of requests on  
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contribution behavior across treatments, these results show a high degree of strategic 
behavior with subjects in intermediate groups taking the second-stage strategic effects 
of their first-stage requests into consideration when stating their requests.  
V. Conclusion  
The present paper proposes a two-stage model linking appropriation and provision 
decisions for studying resource dilemmas under conditions of environmental 
uncertainty. An important feature of the model is that it is possible for users of common 
property resources to collectively achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes without the aid of 
central authority. Using the framework of non-cooperative game theory, we identify 
circumstances in which individual rational users of shared resources make appropriation 
decisions that are both Pareto optimal and in a non-cooperative equilibrium. This 
prediction occurs when groups are fully privileged in the sense that each of its members 
has a dominant strategy of full contribution of the income surplus from the use of the 
shared resource to a public good. It also occurs in the case of intermediate groups, when 
group members strategically exercise restraint in personal harvest as a means to foster 
cooperation in the provision of the public good, thereby maximizing their total income. 
We further identify circumstances in which the presence of provision activities does not 
elicit cooperative behavior in the commons. This prediction occurs in the case of latent 
groups, in which free-riding on the provision efforts of others is a dominant strategy for 
each group member, as well as in the case of intermediate groups in which members do 
not care about the public good. In both of these cases, equilibrium appropriation levels 
from the shared resource are Pareto-deficient, and coincident with those predicted for 
the resource dilemma in the absence of provision activities.  
In a between-subject experimental design operationalizing the theoretical model, we 
examine behavior by fully privileged, intermediate, and latent groups of the same size 
and facing the same level of environmental uncertainty with respect to the size of the 
resource stock. Considered jointly, the results of these experiments generate four 
principal findings. First, the mere presence of subsequent provision decisions that 
depend upon the income generated from the use of the shared resource suffices to elicit 
individual restraint in harvesting behavior, even in the case of latent groups. In fact, 
latent groups are seen to make requests falling in between equilibrium and Pareto-
optimal predictions, conserving the resource at high-efficiency levels, and exceeding 
equilibrium contributions to the public good by substantial amounts. These results for 
latent groups stand in sharp contrast with the high requests and resource-destruction 
levels found in previous studies implementing the resource dilemma as a single-stage 
game using the same environmental uncertainty parameters. Second, resource requests 
by intermediate and privileged group members are significantly lower, and 
contributions to the public good significantly higher, than those made by latent groups. 
In particular, intermediate groups are seen to avoid resource damage at socially efficient 
levels. Third, although contributions to the public good do not differ between 
intermediate and privileged groups, approaching efficient levels in both cases, resource-
use behavior is generally more efficient in the former than in the latter groups. This 
result suggests that more cooperative behavior in the commons is needed from 
intermediate groups in order to generate the same levels of public good provision as that 
achieved by fully privileged groups. Fourth, myopic outcomes are poor predictors of 
behavior. relative to the sophisticated solution concepts, with resource-use behavior by 
all types of groups revealing a high degree of foresight in the two-stage setting.  
Overall, these results contribute to the reconciliation between the overharvesting of 
common property resources, typically observed in experimental settings without 
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contextual or institutional constraints on behavior and the efficient or almost efficient 
management of these resources as exercised by many local communities in natural-
occurring settings. Furthermore, they show that it is possible to view users of common 
property resources as individually rational, self-interested income maximizers, and, at 
the same time, collectively achieving highly efficient outcomes or even preventing 
resource damage at fully efficient levels as demonstrated by the intermediate groups in 
our experiment.  
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Table 1 – Pareto optimal and equilibrium benchmarks (n=5, =250, =750) 
Treatment 
Pareto optimal strategies  Symmetric equilibrium strategies 
R r p  γ  R r p  γ E 
I  : m=0.5 375 75 0.75 56.25 1  625 125 0.25 31.25 0 56% 
II : m=1.0 375 75 0.75 56.25 1 
 
625 125 0.25 31.25 0 56% 
 375 75 0.75 56.25 1 100% 
III: m=1.5 375 75 0.75 56.25 1  375 75 0.75 56.25 1 100% 
Note: R is total group request; r is individual (symmetric) request; p is the probability of receiving the 
request and continuing the game to the second-stage;  is the individual expected payoff in the first stage 
of the game; γ is the fraction of first-stage payoff contributed to the public good; E is the efficiency index 
of first-stage expected payoffs from adoption of equilibrium strategies. 
 
 
Table 2 – Means (standard deviations) of individual requests and contributions 
Treatment r E p γ 
I  : m=0.5 100.90 
(59.18) 
0.80 
(0.43) 
56% 
0.47 
(0.34) 
     
II : m=1.0 
81.32 
(38.45) 
0.93 
(0.37) 
72% 
0.76 
(0.31) 
     
III: m=1.5 
90.24 
(70.07) 
0.87 
(0.55) 
65% 
 
0.72 
(0.30) 
Note: r is individual request; E is the implied efficiency index of first-stage payoffs; p is the percentage of 
rounds continuing the game to the second-stage; γ is the fraction of first-stage individual payoff 
contributed to the public good. 
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Table 3 – Convergence over time of individual requests and contribution fractions 
Dependent 
Variable 
Coefficient Estimates (Standard Error) 
 
95% CI for 2 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 2  LL UL 
Requests:           
   122.81 
(11.55) 
70.15 
(11.64) 
207.70 
(17.89) 
145.09 
(17.21) 
72.58 
(13.42) 
65.55 
(16.84) 
96.11 
(2.13) 
 91.93 100.29 
           
    38.55 
(8.23) 
121.23 
(11.59) 
86.29 
(7.99) 
112.55 
(9.37) 
91.88 
(8.48) 
92.19 
(6.12) 
81.13 
(1.25) 
 78.69 83.58 
           
     84.89 
(12.32) 
86.03 
(4.72) 
81.75 
(7.21) 
166.56 
(22.47) 
146.30 
(12.76) 
53.23 
(15.13) 
87.16 
(1.63) 
 83.95 90.36 
Fractions:           
   0.39 
(0.10) 
0.39 
(0.10) 
0.41 
(0.11) 
0.59 
(0.11) 
0.40 
(0.11) 
0.57 
(0.11) 
0.44 
(0.05) 
 0.34 0.53 
           
    0.66 
(0.09) 
0.48 
(0.09) 
0.80 
(0.09) 
0.49 
(0.10) 
0.55 
(0.09) 
0.50 
(0.09) 
0.79 
(0.05) 
 0.70 0.88 
           
     0.56 
(0.09) 
0.72 
(0.09) 
0.34 
(0.09) 
0.47 
(0.09) 
0.50 
(0.09) 
0.68 
(0.09) 
0.76 
(0.04) 
 0.67 0.84 
Note: LL and UL are, respectively, the lower and upper limit of the 95% confidence interval (CI) for the 
asymptotic value of the dependent variable as measured by the parameter 2. 
 
 
Table 4 – Marginal effects of requests on contribution fractions 
Dependent 
Variable 
Estimate Std. Error z-statistic p-value 
   -0.0008 0.0003 -2.48 0.013 
    -0.0006 0.0003 -1.69 0.092 
     0.0006 0.0002 2.64 0.008 
Note: Given that the dependent variable is naturally bounded between 0 and 1, the estimation of the 
model’s coefficients uses the specification developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). To control for 
time and repeated interaction effects, the model also contains period dummies and the cumulative count 
of failed request awards up to a given period in the experiment. 
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Figure 1 – Mean individual requests by treatment 
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Figure 2 –Contribution as a function of subjects’ endowments by treatment 
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Figure 3–Actual and counter-factual predictions of contribution fractions by subjects in 
intermediate groups 
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